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I have seen Chassidim and אנשי מעשה who, when observing a ta’anit dibbur and needing to inform others of some necessary matter unrelated to prayer, Torah study, and the like, write the words by hand on paper and show them to others. This requires examination, for the halachah is that writing is regarded as speech—meaning that, from a halachic standpoint, writing is treated as actual speech. As explained in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 47:3), one who writes words of Torah, even if he does not read them, must recite a blessing. Thus, it requires examination whether writing in practice detracts from a ta’anit dibbur. This also has practical ramifications regarding writing in the midst of prayer, in situations where speaking constitutes an interruption.
This likewise has significant practical ramifications regarding a ta’anit dibbur during the Tikkun Shovavim, or the segulah of three days of a ta’anit dibbur for memory, cited in the sefer Yaina DeYosef. The question is whether one is restricted from writing matters that are not words of Torah or avodas Hashem. It also has practical ramifications for what the Maharchu wrote in Sha’ar Ruach HaKodesh (p. 11b) in the name of the Arizal: one who sits for forty consecutive days without mundane speech will attain wisdom and spiritual perception. This is also explicit in the Zohar (Chukas 183b): “Esther clothed herself in royalty”—she was clothed in Ruach HaKodesh as a reward for guarding her mouth from saying anything, as it is stated, “Esther did not reveal,” for whoever guards his mouth and tongue merits that Ruach HaKodesh will rest upon him.
With Heaven’s help, it seems possible to justify the common practice of writing mundane matters during a ta’anit dibbur based on the resolution offered in Responsa Rabbi Akiva Eiger (first edition, no. 30). If writing is like speech, how can we function in a beis midrash, where scribes of sifrei Torah, tefillin, and mezuzos write the Tetragrammaton, when it is forbidden nowadays to pronounce it as it is written? Rather, one must distinguish between a case in which one intends the opposite: his writing is not considered reading, and he is therefore not regarded as reading the Name. Accordingly, the same may be said here: since one is particular to observe a ta’anit dibbur and expresses himself specifically in writing rather than through speech, this is the clearest indication that he intends his writing not to be considered speech, but merely writing. We likewise find in several areas of halachah that a contrary intention is effective. According to this reasoning, it is proper to intend while writing that one’s writing not be considered speech; in this manner, one may write even during prayer.
I subsequently saw in Responsa Betzel HaChochmah (vol. 4, no. 88), which discusses writing during prayer. It explains, as stated above, based on Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s words, that if one has a contrary intention, writing is not considered speech. It adds: “Moreover, it appears to me that in our case, even if he does not explicitly have this intention, his writing is not considered speech. For this is why he writes and does not answer orally, which would have been easier and simpler than writing: because he knows that he is forbidden to interrupt through speech. Thus, his intention is that the writing should not be like speech.” The Avnei Nezer (Yoreh De’ah no. 306, sec. 23) wrote similarly.
Maran the Steipler, in his Kehillos Yaakov (Berachos no. 10, sec. 2), further explains that writing is not an interruption during prayer. Only speech uttered with one’s mouth is an interruption to prayer, which is recited with one’s mouth. But speech through thought, although it is regarded as speech, is not spoken with the mouth but in the heart, and does not interrupt the verbal prayer. Therefore, even though writing is like speech, writing is not an interruption during prayer, since one does not speak with his mouth but with his hand; speech produced through writing by hand is not an interruption to verbal speech. According to this, the same reasoning may be applied to writing during a ta’anit dibbur: since the essence of the fast is speech of the mouth, even if one writes, it is not speech of the mouth but writing by hand. Therefore, when necessary, there is no impediment to writing mundane matters by hand.
It further seems possible to explain this based on a novel ruling in Responsa Chasam Sofer (vol. 2, Yoreh De’ah no. 227): there is a distinction between writing intended to effect a legal act or obligate oneself, and the like, and writing that serves in place of speech, such as when one wishes to convey something to another person. When a person wishes to undertake or obligate himself in a certain matter, writing is plainly superior to speech. However, in conveying one’s words to another, so that matters emerging from one’s heart may enter the heart of one’s fellow, speech is superior. The Chasam Sofer writes that this is self-evident to anyone with understanding and knowledge. He explains that this is why, regarding testimony—where the beis din must receive the witnesses’ statements and examine whether they are true—reason dictates that their words and thoughts can be assessed more through their oral speech than through writing. Therefore, the verse’s phrase “from their mouths” excludes “from their writing.” For this reason as well, in the stringent laws of a married woman, we require hearing from the divorcing husband and not from his writing, because the agent does not truly understand the content of the sender’s intention from his writing as he understands it from his speech to him, when one person speaks to another. Likewise, one who vows not to speak with his fellow is not prohibited from writing to him, because in ordinary language the intent is only that he not speak with him, which creates closeness of hearts, unlike writing. It emerges from the Chasam Sofer’s words that when one writes words to his fellow, we do not say that writing is like speech, since writing lacks the full expression attained by saying the words aloud. Accordingly, there is no impediment whatsoever to writing matters to another while observing a ta’anit dibbur. However, one must investigate whether one may also write mundane matters to oneself, such as writing notes for remembrance and the like, for seemingly, according to the Chasam Sofer’s rationale, writing in such a case has no deficiency and is equivalent to actual speech.
Nevertheless, it further appears that one may write mundane matters during a ta’anit dibbur even for oneself. The essential force and segulah of a ta’anit dibbur is that a person sanctifies his mouth exclusively for Torah and avodas Hashem. Although writing is considered speech, it is nevertheless not like speaking with one’s mouth, but rather like speech conveyed through writing.
A proof may also be brought from what we find concerning Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai in the Yerushalmi (Berachos 1:2). He said: Had I stood at Mount Sinai when the Torah was given to Israel, I would have asked Hashem to create two mouths for a person—one to engage in Torah, and one to attend to all his needs and to pray for his needs as well, rather than using the mouth occupied with Torah. He then retracted, saying that one should not question the ways of the Holy One, blessed be He, Who created a person with one mouth. For even now, when a person has one mouth, the world cannot endure because of his lashon hara; if he had two mouths, how much more so. This shows that the primary concern is that one sanctify the mouth with which he speaks words of Torah for the service of Hashem.
This response was translated automatically from Hebrew and has not yet been reviewed by a person. Therefore, it may contain inaccuracies and should not be considered a definitive reference.
