Thank you for the important observation. Elsewhere, we discussed at length, with Heaven’s help, the ruling of Maran Rabbeinu Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, zt”l, in Shut Yechaveh Da’at, vol. 5, no. 64, that the principle of dina demalchuta dina applies to tax payments even in the State of Israel. There, Maran zt”l cited proof from the Zohar and Tosafot in Sanhedrin that Achav had the status of a king for this purpose even though he was wicked. We discussed all this at length there; see there. However, the son of Ravina, the eminent Rabbi Yaakov Yosef, zt”l, wrote in his work Kuntres Be’itah Achishenah, p. 117, to reject the words of Maran Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, as follows: “It appears to me that even according to my father’s view in Shut Yechaveh Da’at, that dina demalchuta applies even to a wicked king such as Achav, nevertheless one cannot derive from there—from the time of Achav—to our times. One may distinguish and say that in Achav’s time payments from the royal treasury were not made to secular schools, universities, or for the drafting of girls. For only in the Second Temple era did Yehoshua ben Gamla institute schools for young children, as explained in Bava Batra 21b. In such a situation, one can say dina demalchuta, perhaps because the heir to the throne will be righteous, as it is written, ‘The wicked prepares, but the righteous will wear it.’ But in our times, certainly one cannot say dina demalchuta dina.” End quote. Seemingly, he means that because some tax revenues in the State of Israel go to forbidden purposes, this constitutes assisting transgressors, unlike in Achav’s time. [However, it is unclear why he needed to add the reasoning that Achav’s heir might be righteous; see further below.]
Yet, with all due deference to the greatness of the saintly son of the meritorious Maran, Rabbi Yaakov Yosef, zt”l, Achav also most likely directed tax revenues toward forbidden purposes. After all, he built a temple and altar for Baal (“the house of Baal”—I Kings 16:32), and presumably also offered sacrifices there. Moreover, four hundred prophets of Baal and Asherah ate at his table every day (I Kings 18:19). From where came all this money, if not from the royal treasury’s tax revenues? [Possibly Rabbi Yaakov Yosef, zt”l, also recognized that Achav presumably used tax revenues for undesirable purposes, since he was wicked. This is why he added that perhaps the heir to the throne would nevertheless be righteous, in which case at least a large portion of the money now entering the king’s treasury would ultimately go toward good purposes. But this is difficult, for we should say the same regarding the State of Israel: most tax revenues go toward permitted purposes—with certainty, not merely perhaps—and this is no less than the possibility that the heir will be righteous. After all, even if the heir is righteous, some of the funds have already been used by his wicked father.]
It appears that the late eminent Rabbi Yaakov Yosef, zt”l, overlooked what is written in the responsa of Maharik, Shoresh 194: even if the ruler proclaimed that all taxes paid by the Jews would go toward avodah zarah, there is no concern, since the Jews pay their tax into the ruler’s treasury, and what the ruler gives to avodah zarah is from his own pocket. See there. Pischei Choshen, Hilchot Gezelah, ch. 1, p. 18 (new edition), likewise derives this from the above words of Maharik, adding that taxes are taken against a person’s will (and even if one actively files a report, it is considered against his will). Therefore, no prohibition of assisting transgressors, or the like, applies here at all. See there.
In truth, it appears that Maharik needed to state this only because the ruler had proclaimed that these particular funds would go specifically toward avodah zarah. Ordinarily, however, giving money involves no concern whatsoever of lifnei iver, nor even a concern of mesaye’a yedei ovrei aveirah—even where the recipient of the money is a Jew. For even if we were to say that his money is regarded as going directly toward its use and that the government has not acquired it, and even if we were to say that we rule “ein bereirah” and one cannot stipulate that his money go only toward a permitted purpose, it is nevertheless regarded as uncertain for which purpose his money will be used. Since the money itself is not an object of prohibition, as it can be put to proper use, all agree that lifnei iver does not apply, as we discussed at length, in our limited capacity, regarding this principle—especially according to Ritva—in our humble work, L’Laket Shoshanim, vol. 6, Shoresh 7. This is likewise the ruling in Mishnah Shevi’it 5:8: one may sell, and likewise give, an ox used for plowing during Shevi’it even to one suspected of violating Shevi’it, because he may slaughter it. [This is all the more so with money, for money itself cannot be used to commit any transgression. It is unlike an ox and the like, which can at least be used for plowing; rather, one can pay with money and thereby arrive at forbidden matters. It may be considered “lifnei d’lifnei”; see our aforementioned small work, p. 364.]
Furthermore, this is considered chad avra denahara, not trei avrei denahara. Even according to the Mishneh LaMelech, who holds that when the only way to obtain something is through other Jews it is considered trei avrei, this case differs, since the state already has sufficient money for those activities from what it collected earlier. It is comparable to a nazir who owns many barrels of wine: although he acquired those barrels from another Jew, it is nevertheless chad avra denahara with respect to someone now coming to pour him a fresh cup of wine. Consequently, only the Rabbinic prohibition of mesaye’a could apply. Since the time of tax payment is not the time when the transgression is performed, there is no prohibition at all, as we cited in our aforementioned small work, Shoresh 7, no. 14, branch 3, from the words of scholars and from written sources, with Heaven’s help. In addition, many other leniencies apply, as we presented there in no. 14, such as that mesaye’a does not apply to an apostate, and others; see there. Moreover, since it has been reduced to a Rabbinic prohibition, one may maintain that there is bereirah, and what he gives is consequently considered as given for permitted purposes—at least regarding the prohibition of mesaye’a; understand this well.
All this applies even to an object, and certainly to money, which is given to be spent: the money used by the government is no longer attributed to the giver, as Maharik wrote above. This is all the more so nowadays, when tax payments do not reach the government in the form of cash bills—where one could at least argue that one’s particular bill ultimately goes toward paying for undesirable activities. Rather, everything is done by deleting numbers from what is recorded in one person’s bank account and adding numbers to the state’s account. In such a case, there is no direct connection between the person whose numbers were deleted and payment for carrying out a forbidden purpose.
See also Shut Ahalah Shel Torah, vol. 4, no. 16, which states that every segment of the population objects to some of the purposes for which tax revenues are used. For example, our secular, anti-religious brethren who have gone astray do not agree that their tax money should fund kollelim, yeshivot, and Talmudei Torah, while we who tremble at the word of Hashem do not agree that the money should fund their heretical schools. Nevertheless, the state obligates everyone to pay and also provides for everyone, in consideration of the population’s differing wishes. Indeed, there are inequalities in the allocations, and on that basis there may be, to a certain degree, a side-based leniency regarding tax evasion—but not a blanket leniency, since this is not an intrinsic basis for leniency, as will be explained later, with Hashem’s help. In such a case, all agree that we say yesh bereirah, since the structure of the system indicates that the money of each population group is collected for the needs of that group itself. One may question his words, but in any event there is no concern, as explained above.
In the book Bi Melachim Yimlochu, ch. 7, several sound reasons are likewise given why neither lifnei iver nor mesaye’a applies at all to paying taxes to the State of Israel. It adds that even if there were a concern, efforts to evade taxes also entail concern for mishap, chilul Hashem, incitement against the chareidi ציבור, and the like. They also prevent the government from doing things that are beneficial, good, and necessary for the public. This is included in what Chazon Ish wrote in Shevi’it, no. 12, sec. 9: “For if we come to be stringent in cases of doubt, we will also create a stumbling block by withholding kindness and the ways of life and peace from ourselves and from them. They are merely amei ha’aretz [and, regarding the benefit of tax revenues, most beneficiaries are tinokot shenishbu and not wicked people, as Chazon Ish himself ruled], and we are obligated to sustain them and do good for them. All the more so, we must not increase hatred and strife between ourselves and them, thereby violating ‘You shall not hate’ and several other prohibitions, whose severity is no less than the prohibition from which we seek to save them,” etc. End quote. Similarly, Shut Minchat Shlomo Auerbach, vol. 1, no. 35, sec. 1, states that even when placing food before one who certainly will not recite a berachah—where the outcome will certainly be a transgression, not merely a doubt—one must consider that withholding it could lead to more serious transgressions, such as anger and hatred toward the ways of Torah. See there. The same applies to tax evasion. Although one may distinguish, in any event it has already been explained that no concern applies here at all. Indeed, if this involved a prohibition, we would have to challenge the permissibility of purchasing nonessential items, since through such purchases one pays VAT. Though this is against his will, no one asked him to purchase nonessential items; nevertheless, one may distinguish, and this is not the place to elaborate. It would certainly also provide an additional reason to prohibit buying a ticket from Mifal HaPais, since some of those funds are likewise used for secular schools and the construction of mixed swimming pools and the like—in addition to the prohibition of asmachta. It is surprising that some Torah scholars have not accepted as conclusive the ruling in Shut Yabia Omer prohibiting the purchase of a Mifal HaPais ticket on grounds of asmachta (see Shumat Nezikin, p. 87, s.v. Uv’inyan Shalach, though it is likely that he was not precise in understanding the ruling). Yet when it comes to the issue of tax payments, they become concerned about mesaye’a and challenge what was written in Shut Yechaveh Da’at prohibiting tax evasion. This requires consideration.
In connection with the above, it is worth noting what is cited in the name of Rabbi Ben-Zion Abba Shaul, zt”l, in Or L’Tzion, Zikaron Hadassah (Mussar), Sha’ar HaMitzvot, at the end of essay 4: “Incidentally, let us write a note on this matter. The money the government takes from us—if we are already obligated to pay it, we should at least intend that it be for tzedakah. The government distributes money to people, and it is possible that among them are people who are truly needy. One should also intend that perhaps he has stolen from the public or the like, concerning which our Sages said: one who stole and does not know from whom he stole should use it for public needs (Beitzah 29a). With this money taken by the government, public needs are provided—roads, lighting, and the like—from which everyone benefits. Since public needs are provided through his money, his sin of theft is thereby atoned for.” End quote. This implies that he holds that bereirah applies here. What was written there in the note does not appear to reflect his intention, but this is not the place to elaborate.
This response was translated automatically from Hebrew and has not yet been reviewed by a person. Therefore, it may contain inaccuracies and should not be considered a definitive reference.
