Sources and Reasoning:
Desecrating Shabbat for Mental Distress
a). Although we find that they permitted violating a rabbinic prohibition in a case of suffering, as stated in the Shulchan Aruch (siman 316, סעיף 9) regarding trapping a flea found on one’s flesh that is biting him; see also the Shulchan Aruch (siman 328, סעיף 33) regarding one who groans and nurses milk on Shabbat. However, those cases differ, for they involve actual physical suffering. In our case, where there is no physical suffering at all but rather mental distress and pressure, it must be considered whether they likewise permitted desecrating Shabbat in such circumstances.
First, I will begin with what the Shulchan Aruch writes (siman 306, סעיף 9): It is forbidden to tell a non-Jew to go beyond the techum on Shabbat to summon relatives of a deceased person to come and eulogize him. However, regarding an ill person whose condition is overwhelming him and who asks that his relatives be sent for, it is certainly permitted. This implies that it is permitted to desecrate Shabbat for an ill person even where there is no physical danger, but rather because of mental distress. This is likewise explained in the Shulchan Aruch (siman 330, סעיף 1) regarding a woman in childbirth, for whom Shabbat is desecrated for everything she needs, even if she is blind and asks for a lamp to be lit, for the sake of calming her mind. Nevertheless, this may be rejected, for those cases differ because they are already in a state of illness, and there is greater concern lest their illness intensify. But regarding other people, perhaps they are required to calm their minds, as we say in Sukkah (25a): even if one’s ship sank at sea, he is not exempt on the grounds of being preoccupied, since he must compose his mind. Here too, perhaps we should say that he must calm his mind and strengthen himself in trust in Hashem.
b). The Shulchan Aruch (siman 309, סעיף 1) explains regarding a child who longs for his father that the father may lift him, even though he thereby moves muktzeh indirectly. Likewise, the Mishnah Berurah (siman 328, se’if katan 38) permits breaking down a door for the sake of a child; see there. The source is the Gemara in Yoma (84b). However, this too is not proof for our case, in light of what Responsa Chavat Yair (siman 191) writes as to why tza’ar ba’alei chayim does not apply to a person. He explains that since a person possesses understanding, he must calm his mind, unlike an animal. Accordingly, a child who lacks understanding is like an animal in this regard. It may further be rejected, because a child is different, as it constitutes a possible danger to life, whereas we are discussing only mental distress. This was stated explicitly by the Gaon Ya’avetz in his work Mor U’Ketzi’ah (s.v. katav ha-Magen Avraham), and was likewise ruled in practice in Responsa Shevet HaLevi, vol. VIII (siman 75).
c). However, seemingly proof may be brought from what Tehillah LeDavid (siman 328, se’if katan 49) writes concerning the Magen Avraham: that it is permitted to change a bandage on Shabbat, even though this is not treatment, but rather mental distress because the person does not want it that way. Similarly, the Rema (siman 317, end of סעיף 1) explains that one whose shoe became tied may untie it on Shabbat even with two knots, because of distress. There too, it is not physical suffering, since he is already wearing shoes, but rather ordinary distress at lacking footwear. See also Tehillah LeDavid (siman 317, se’if katan 4). In Responsa Igrot Moshe (vol. II, Yoreh De’ah, siman 174, end of branch 1), proof is brought from Eliyahu the Prophet, who, although he was a kohen, revived the son of the Shunammite woman. Tosafot in Bava Metzia (114b, s.v. amar) write that since he was certain the child would live, this was permitted because of pikuach nefesh. This is a great novelty, for the child had already died, and all permission we find to violate a prohibition for pikuach nefesh is based on the verse, “and live by them.” Once he had died, on what basis would it be permitted to violate a prohibition in order to revive him? Rabbi Moshe Feinstein explained that the pikuach nefesh concerned the mother, who was in great distress; see there. Supporting this is the Netziv (Emek She’elah, end of Parashat Bamidbar, p. 120, se’if katan 3), who explains the Gemara (Berachot 31a), where Chanah said, “I will go and seclude myself before my husband,” and she was permitted to erase the Name of Hashem because of this distress, etc. It is possible that there, the distress was so great as to constitute actual pikuach nefesh, and this is why it was permitted.
d). See also Responsa Igrot Moshe (vol. IV, Orach Chaim, siman 90), which permits taking a disabled person to a family celebration through a non-Jew where there is no eruv, because he would otherwise suffer distress. See also Responsa Sama DeChayei (siman 8), which permits opening a letter through a non-Jew because of the distress of not knowing what it says. (However, it concludes that this is forbidden, because opening a letter is a Torah prohibition; but it is lenient regarding a rabbinic prohibition.) Also, in Ma’or HaShabbat, vol. IV (siman 14, letter 164), it is cited in the name of Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv that one may be lenient and turn off the loud ringing of a telephone or an alarm that disturbs his rest. Rabbi Yitzchak Zilberstein shlit”a writes in Melachim Omnayich (chapter 11, סעיף 10) that if the door of one’s house has come loose, and he is afraid and unsettled, he may reattach it on Shabbat.
e). Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l writes in Responsa Minchat Shlomo, vol. I (end of siman 7), that regarding a fire, we find that they did not permit extinguishing it even if one’s entire house and all its contents were burning. Seemingly, there can be no greater distress than this, and it could also lead to danger; nevertheless, they did not permit extinguishing it. See also Shemirat Shabbat KeHilchatah (chapter 41, note 8), which remains uncertain about this matter. However, in my humble opinion, no proof can be brought from extinguishing a fire, for there the Sages were more stringent because a person becomes alarmed over his property, as stated in Shabbat (117b), and they did not wish to make their rulings dependent on subjective measures. In Shulchan Shlomo (Erchei Refuah, vol. I, p. 97, note 22), it is cited in the name of Rabbi Avigdor Nebenzahl shlit”a that he discussed this matter extensively with Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, and toward the end of his life he agreed to be lenient, because one must be concerned for heart illness; see there. See also the pamphlet Over Oreach by the Aderet (siman 334), which discusses one who sees before his eyes manuscripts on which he labored for many years being lost; he may desecrate Shabbat for this, since it constitutes danger to life. It appears that everything depends on the circumstances and each case must be judged individually, particularly regarding a rabbinic prohibition or a shevut de-shevut, where there is greater room for leniency.
This response was translated automatically from Hebrew and has not yet been reviewed by a person. Therefore, it may contain inaccuracies and should not be considered a definitive reference.
