Sources and Reasons:
The Prohibition of Lifnei Iver Lo Titen Michshol—Applies Only When the Person Who May Stumble Cannot Reach the Prohibition Independently
The Gemara in Maseches Avodah Zarah 6a states: From where do we know that one may not hand a cup of wine to a nazir or a limb taken from a living animal to a Noachide? The verse states: “And before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block.”
However, the Gemara there explains that this applies only where, without the person causing the stumbling, the transgressor would not have been able to commit the transgression—for example, one who hands a cup of wine to a nazir when the nazir is standing on the other side of a river and cannot reach the cup without the one offering it.
Tosafos there, Avodah Zarah 6a, s.v. Minayin shelo yoshit אדם kos yayin lenazir, wrote that the same applies to all prohibitions: it is forbidden to cause a person to stumble in transgression. Tosafos emphasized, however, as follows: “This refers to where he is standing in a place where he cannot take it unless this person hands it to him, as the Gemara concludes, where they are standing on opposite sides of a river.”
Rabbeinu Yerucham, Nesiv 17, part 6, likewise wrote:
It is forbidden to hand a limb taken from a living animal to Noachides because of ‘and before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block.’ This applies specifically where they cannot take it without a Jew, such as where they are standing on opposite sides of a river and they could not transgress without the Jew who gives it to them. But if they can take it without the Jew, it is permitted to give it to them, as is clear in Avodah Zarah.
Is There a Prohibition of Mesaye’a Lidvar Aveirah Where the Person Who May Stumble Can Reach the Prohibition Alone?
However, Tosafos in Shabbos 3a indicates that although the prohibition of lifnei iver lo titen michshol does not apply where the person who may stumble can reach the prohibition without the one causing the stumbling, there nevertheless remains a rabbinic prohibition of mesaye’a lidvar aveirah.
The Mishnah at the beginning of Maseches Shabbos 2a states: “The laws of carrying out on Shabbos are two, which are four inside, and two, which are four outside. How so? A poor person stands outside and the homeowner is inside. If the poor person extended his hand inside and placed [an object] into the homeowner’s hand, or took [an object] from it and carried it out, the poor person is liable and the homeowner is exempt.” The Gemara there on 3a explains that in the case presented by the Mishnah, the homeowner is not merely exempt, but is even permitted lechatchilah to extend his hand to the poor person.
Tosafos there asks: How may the homeowner extend his hand for the poor person to take from it? Does he not violate the prohibition of lifnei iver or the prohibition of mesaye’a? This is the language of Tosafos there:
“Yet does he not violate ‘and before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block’? Even if it refers to a case where he could have taken it even had it not been in his hand, such that he does not violate lifnei iver—for the case of handing a cup of wine to a nazir is explained in the first chapter of Avodah Zarah (6b) as referring to where they stand on opposite sides of a river—nevertheless, there is at least a rabbinic prohibition, for he is obligated to separate him from transgression. Even if it refers to a non-Jew, to whom lifnei iver does not apply, there is nevertheless a rabbinic prohibition, as was taught at the end of the chapter (19a): We may give food to a non-Jew in the courtyard; if he takes it and goes out, we need not concern ourselves with him. This implies that only when the non-Jew is in the courtyard is this permitted; but if he stands outside and extends his hand inside, it appears forbidden to give it to him directly with the intention that he carry it out. It may be answered that it refers to a non-Jew and to an object belonging to the non-Jew, for even if he carries it in and out all day, there is no prohibition at all, since the object does not belong to the homeowner.”
Tosafos explicitly teaches that even where there is no prohibition of lifnei iver, such as where they are not standing on opposite sides of a river, there is a rabbinic prohibition of mesaye’a lidvar aveirah. The Rosh wrote likewise, as did the Ran on Avodah Zarah 6a.
Regarding practical halachah, the Rema, Yoreh De’ah 151:1, cites two views and rules as follows:
Items that are designated for a particular form of idolatrous worship in that place may not be sold to the worshippers of that form of idolatry in that place… Gloss: Some say that the prohibition against selling them items related to their worship applies only if they do not have others like them or cannot purchase them elsewhere. But if they can purchase them elsewhere, it is permitted to sell them anything. Others are stringent. The custom is to be lenient in accordance with the first view, but every conscientious person should be stringent for himself.
In light of the above, it appears that in the case at hand, since the customers can obtain non-kosher food in another way, there is no prohibition of lifnei iver lo titen michshol. Even the prohibition of mesaye’a is subject to a dispute among the poskim. According to the basic halachah, the custom follows the lenient first view, although a conscientious person should be stringent.
Does the Prohibition of Mesaye’a Apply When Assisting an Apostate or a Non-Jew?
However, the Shach, Yoreh De’ah 151:6, explained that there is no disagreement between the two views cited by the Rema. Rather, all agree that the prohibition of mesaye’a applies even where the person who may stumble can reach the prohibition on his own, without the one causing the stumbling. This is comparable to the fact that we are commanded to separate even a minor Jew from eating neveilos, whereas we are not commanded to separate an apostate from eating neveilos.
Based on this, it may be said that since most people who eat non-kosher food are apostate Jews who desecrate Shabbos, the prohibition of mesaye’a does not apply to them. Therefore, a person may make deliveries of non-kosher food, and there is no need to be concerned about the prohibition of mesaye’a lidvar aveirah, since most people who order non-kosher food are either non-Jews or apostate Jews.
The Prohibition of Mesaye’a Lidvar Aveirah—Where There Is Reason to Assume That No Transgression Will Occur
Responsa Yechaveh Daas, vol. 3, no. 67, further proved that the prohibition of mesaye’a applies only where the recipient of the assistance will certainly transgress as a result of that assistance, and not where there is reason to assume that he will not stumble in transgression. Therefore, he wrote that it is not forbidden to sell sleeveless dresses, since it may be assumed that the women will wear these dresses with a blouse underneath.
Based on this, it may likewise be said in our case that since most customers are non-Jews, and even those Jews who order non-kosher food to their homes may have non-Jewish foreign workers or may have invited non-Jewish acquaintances to their homes, it is not forbidden under the prohibition of mesaye’a to deliver non-kosher food to their homes.
The Prohibition of Mesaye’a Lidvar Aveirah—Where the Assistance Is Not at the Time of the Transgression Itself
In addition, in the case at hand one may combine the words of Responsa Binyan Tzion, part 1, no. 15, which writes that the prohibition of assisting transgressors applies only when one assists him at the time of the act of transgression, since one is obligated to separate him rather than assist him. However, if one assists him before the act of transgression, it is permitted. See there. In accordance with Responsa Binyan Tzion, the Netziv wrote in Responsa Meshiv Davar, vol. 2, nos. 31–32, as did other Acharonim.
Accordingly, in our case as well, since the worker only assists by transporting the food from the restaurant to the eater’s home, but does not hand him the food at the time of eating and merely leaves the food at the entrance to the home, it may be said that there is no prohibition of mesaye’a lidvar aveirah, since this is not at the time of the act of transgression.
This response was translated automatically from Hebrew and has not yet been reviewed by a person. Therefore, it may contain inaccuracies and should not be considered a definitive reference.
This response was translated automatically from Hebrew and has not yet been reviewed by a person. It may therefore contain inaccuracies and should not be considered a definitive reference.
