“Euthanasia” for Animals

It is permitted to euthanize animals in order to hasten their end and relieve them of the suffering surrounding them. Nevertheless, this should be done in the least painful manner possible, such as by an anesthetic injection or the like, in order to ease their suffering. However, it is not proper to deliberately place weak animals before strong animals so that they will prey upon and eat them, because this will cause them great suffering. 

With blessings,

Sources:

1). It is clear that this should not be compared to what Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch write (Yoreh De’ah, no. 339): “Whoever hastens the departure of the soul is a shedder of blood.” For this reason, it is forbidden to remove the pillow from beneath the head of a dying person. The Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 34) writes that even if Elijah the Prophet were to come and say that the person has only one more moment to live, nevertheless, the Torah makes no distinction between one who kills a child in the prime of life and one who kills a hundred-year-old elder. From here, halachic authorities have derived that it is absolutely forbidden to hasten a person’s death, even in order to relieve him of the suffering in which he is immersed. However, this applies specifically to a human being, who possesses the sanctity of life and is commanded to preserve his body and soul; see Gesher HaChaim, vol. I (ch. 2, sec. 2, note 3). This is self-evident.

2). Halachic authorities disagree as to whether the prohibition of causing suffering to animals applies only when one causes an animal pain while leaving it alive, or also when killing animals. In the responsa Noda BiYehudah (second edition, Yoreh De’ah, no. 10), he discusses a wealthy man whom God had blessed with a large estate, including villages and forests in which every beast of the field roamed, and whether he may personally go out and hunt with a firearm, or whether a Jew is forbidden to do so, either because of causing suffering to animals or because of the prohibition of needless destruction. He replied: Anything that serves a human need does not involve causing suffering to animals. Furthermore, causing suffering to animals applies only when one causes it pain and leaves it alive; but killing cattle, wild animals, and all kinds of living creatures does not involve causing suffering to animals. It appears that the second reason he gives applies even where it is not for the person’s own need: whenever one kills the animal and it immediately no longer senses or feels pain, there is no prohibition of causing suffering to animals.

The Noda BiYehudah brought proof for his position from an explicit Gemara in Chullin (7b): Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair did not wish to dine in Rabbi’s home because he saw white mules there, which belonged to Rabbi. He said, “The Angel of Death is in this man’s house, and shall I dine with him?”—for they kill with their bites, and there is no cure for their bite. Rabbi said to him, “I will sell them.” He replied, “But you would thereby place a stumbling block before the blind.” Rabbi said, “I will declare them ownerless.” He replied, “They will multiply the danger.” Rabbi said, “I will hamstring them.” He replied, “There is suffering to animals.” Rabbi said, “I will kill them.” He replied, “There is needless destruction.” This is the passage. Since Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair did not respond to “I will kill them” by saying, “But there is suffering to animals,” and mentioned only the prohibition of destruction, this proves the Noda BiYehudah’s position that killing them does not violate the prohibition of causing suffering to animals. I likewise found in the work Avodat HaGershuni (no. 13) that he proved that there is no requirement to choose a pleasant death for animals, for they are not “your brother.” He drew support from the above Gemara in Chullin, which indicates that there is no prohibition of causing suffering to animals when they are killed.

It further appears that their view may be supported by what Tosafot write in Bava Kamma (115b, s.v. ve’lo): that which the Gemara states—that one may not give uncovered water to an animal—is not limited to a kosher animal, as Rashi writes, lest one slaughter it and endanger the person who eats it; rather, it applies even to a non-kosher animal, because of “needless destruction.” Seemingly, from the fact that Tosafot mention the prohibition of needless destruction rather than the prohibition of causing suffering to animals by giving it poison, it is evident that killing an animal does not involve causing suffering to animals. This is likewise apparent from the Yam Shel Shlomo (Bava Kamma, ch. 10, no. 37, cited in Taz, Yoreh De’ah, end of no. 116), who writes that one who has a dog in his home that harms him and spoils the food in the house, even if it does not bite, may give it poison and does not violate the prohibition of causing suffering to animals. For Tosafot prohibited this with respect to a non-kosher animal only because of needless destruction, which does not apply here. It is evident that he understood that killing an animal does not involve causing suffering to animals; the entire discussion concerns needless destruction, and where it serves one’s benefit—such as where the animal causes him damage—it is not considered destruction. The Taz cites the Yam Shel Shlomo’s ruling as halachah (Yoreh De’ah, no. 116, subsec. 6). This was likewise ruled in accordance with the Noda BiYehudah by the Gilyon Maharshal (ibid.), the responsa Har Tzvi (Orach Chaim, no. 194), and the responsa Tzitz Eliezer, vol. XIV (no. 68).

In the responsa Sho’el UMeishiv (second edition, vol. III, no. 65), however, he rejects this position based on the Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 451), which explains that the reason for the mitzvah to slaughter from the neck is that most blood exits through the neck, and also because of causing suffering to animals. Likewise, using a blemished knife is forbidden because of causing suffering to animals. He proves from this that causing suffering to animals applies by Torah law even at the time of their death. Indeed, early authorities had already written this regarding the rationale for the mitzvot of slaughter; see Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim (vol. III, ch. 48), Ramban (Genesis 1:29), Radbaz (Metzudat David, mitzvah 4), and others.

However, this is not conclusive, for it may be said that the Torah commands that where it is possible to kill them through an easy and proper death, one should not torment them with suffering until their soul departs. But where this is not possible, such as through hunting, and one causes only the pain necessary in order to kill it, there is no prohibition, as the Noda BiYehudah writes. Thus, whenever one kills them, there is no prohibition of causing suffering to animals; rather, if one cruelly kills them through a difficult death where one could kill them through an easy death, then even in killing them there is a prohibition of causing suffering to animals, even according to the Noda BiYehudah. This is explicitly evident from Rambam’s words (ibid.), who writes: “The Torah’s intent is the easiest of deaths. It prohibited tormenting them through improper slaughter or through stabbing, and [prohibited] cutting off a limb from them.” Thus, the primary concern is not to torment them in their death. I saw that the responsa Mishneh Halachot, vol. X (no. 82), had already preceded me in this point.

However, I saw one of the early authorities, Rabbi Yosef ibn Migash (cited in Shitah Mekubetzet, Bava Batra 20a), who appears to hold that causing suffering to animals applies even when they are killed. The Gemara in Bava Batra (ibid.) explains that a dangling limb or piece of flesh reduces the size of an opening for purposes of ritual impurity. The Gemara asks: Why not cut it off and throw it to the dogs? It answers: Because of causing suffering to animals, he would not do so. Tosafot ask (ibid., s.v. keivan): Why not take the entire animal and throw it to the dogs? They answer that it refers to a monkey, which is unfit for dogs. Rabbi Yosef ibn Migash asks similarly: Perhaps he should slaughter the entire animal, cut off the limb, and give it to the dogs? He answers that it is not normal practice to slaughter an animal in order to throw it before dogs. In his second answer, he writes that since it is unfit for slaughter because its limbs are dangling, slaughtering it would also constitute causing suffering to animals; it would be killing rather than slaughter. This indicates that he holds that one violates the prohibition of causing suffering to animals even by killing it, contrary to the view of the Noda BiYehudah.

3). Nevertheless, in our case, not only according to the Noda BiYehudah and those who agree with him would euthanasia not involve causing suffering to animals, but even according to the Sho’el UMeishiv, who disagrees, it may be said that, on the contrary, where one shortens their suffering and hastens their relief, there is no prohibition of causing suffering to animals.

Indeed, it is cited in the work Dinim VeHanhagot from Maran the Chazon Ish, vol. II (p. 40), that he instructed that a fly fluttering between life and death be killed, so that it would not continue suffering from its injury. I likewise saw in the responsa VeShav VeRafa, vol. III (no. 257), that he permits killing suffering animals in order to hasten their death and shorten their suffering. This involves neither causing suffering to animals nor needless destruction. He writes that Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch agreed with him in this ruling.

4). It appears that there is likewise no prohibition of needless destruction in such a case. First, causing suffering to animals is a Torah prohibition according to most halachic authorities, as is also evident from the Shulchan Aruch (no. 305, sec. 19), whereas the prohibition of needless destruction is rabbinic with regard to anything other than a fruit tree, as the Noda BiYehudah writes (ibid.). Furthermore, their hide and meat may be used after their death. Additionally, it is possible that in their present condition, they have no monetary value at all, and there is no issue of needless destruction.

5). Certainly, however, it is proper not to throw them with one’s own hands to predatory animals while life still pulses within them. This involves causing suffering to animals, as the predators tear off their limbs and abuse them until they kill them. Moreover, this reflects a trait of cruelty, as Rema writes (Even HaEzer, no. 5, sec. 14): It is permitted to pluck feathers from live geese, and there is no concern of causing suffering to animals; nevertheless, people refrain from doing so because it is cruel. (In our case, it is even more severe.) See Igrot Moshe, vol. II (Choshen Mishpat, no. 47).