Sources and Explanations:
Whether shaking hands with a woman is prohibited by the Torah or rabbinically:
A). Maran the Beit Yosef (Yoreh De’ah §195) wrote in the name of the Terumat HaDeshen (§252) that it is forbidden for a niddah whose husband is a physician to have him feel her pulse. He likewise cited the responsum of the Ramban (attributed responsa, §127), which states that it is forbidden for a husband to feel the pulse of his niddah wife. He wrote that it appears from the Ramban’s words that this is forbidden even where no other physicians are available. However, if the illness is life-threatening and no other physicians are present, his words somewhat imply that it is permitted because of pikuach nefesh. Yet one may say that this follows his own view, namely, that contact with a niddah is only rabbinically prohibited. But according to the Rambam, who holds that contact with an ervah is prohibited by the Torah, even where pikuach nefesh is involved, it may be forbidden because it is included among the ancillary prohibitions of forbidden relations. This requires further examination. These are his words.
Thus, the Beit Yosef understood the Rambam to hold that even contact not intended for desire is included in forbidden relations, for feeling a pulse entails no pleasure and is not done in a manner of desire or affection. Nevertheless, he wrote that according to the Rambam it is an ancillary prohibition of forbidden relations, and even if the woman is in a life-threatening condition and there are no other physicians, her husband may not touch her, since this falls under the principle of “one must be killed rather than transgress.”
However, the Shach (Yoreh De’ah §195, subsec. 20) disagreed with the Beit Yosef, maintaining that even according to the Rambam there is no “Torah prohibition” unless it is done in a manner of desire and affection. This implies that there is a rabbinic prohibition even when it is not done in a manner of marital affection. See also the Shach (Yoreh De’ah §157, subsec. 10), who proved that there is a Torah prohibition only when done in a manner of desire, from the fact that in several places we find Amoraim embracing and kissing their daughters and sisters.
B). Nevertheless, it is possible that the Beit Yosef also held that according to all opinions there is no Torah prohibition in contact with an ervah when it is not in a manner of desire and affection. However, regarding one’s niddah wife, since he is familiar and intimate with her, any contact may be one of affection, since he loves her and she is close to him. This differs from another married woman, with whom he has no such familiarity; when he does not intend affection in his contact, there is no Torah prohibition. Therefore, the Beit Yosef wrote that perhaps according to the Rambam, who holds—unlike the Ramban—that contact for affection is prohibited by the Torah, a niddah is also forbidden for this reason. That is, it is likely that it will lead to pleasure and a Torah prohibition.
Maran the Chida wrote likewise in his work Kise David (Derush 25 for Shabbat HaGadol), citing the words of the Beit Yosef. I also found that Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, of blessed memory, wrote this reasoning independently in Igrot Moshe (Yoreh De’ah, vol. III, §54, letter B, at the end). See also Torat HaShelamim (Yoreh De’ah §195, ad loc.). See further what Maran wrote at length on this matter in Taharat HaBayit, vol. II (p. 222).
C). In any event, there is certainly a rabbinic prohibition against contact even when not for affection or desire. This follows plainly according to the Rambam and most Rishonim who ruled in accordance with him, and so ruled Maran the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer §20:1): contact for desire entails a Torah prohibition and lashes. Thus, it may be said that contact not for affection or desire entails, at the very least, a rabbinic prohibition as a safeguard lest it lead to desire; the Sages established a fence. (Only according to the Ramban, who holds that contact for affection is rabbinically prohibited, may one say that where there is no pleasure, there is not even a rabbinic prohibition.)
It is also logical that a rabbinic prohibition exists. Otherwise, an astonishing result would emerge: according to the Rambam as understood by the Beit Yosef, contact with an ervah not for desire is a Torah prohibition, and even in the absence of anyone else, in a dangerous situation, it may not be permitted; whereas according to the Shach’s understanding of the Rambam, it would be permitted ab initio. Their disagreement would be from one extreme to the other, which is difficult to assert. Therefore, even according to the Shach, there must at least be a rabbinic prohibition. So too I saw in Igrot Moshe (Yoreh De’ah, vol. III, §54, letter A), which understood the Shach as holding that there is at least a rabbinic prohibition. This also appears from the Vilna Gaon’s comments on the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah §195, subsec. 21), where he wrote that the reason the Rema was lenient regarding feeling the pulse and other forms of contact is that he maintained that the prohibition of “Do not come near” applies only when one intends it for forbidden relations; otherwise, “it is only rabbinic.” (It is strained to say that he meant only the prohibition of niddah.) I also saw that the Chida wrote in his work (Kise David, Derush 25, s.v. “Amnam”) that even according to the Rambam there is no Torah prohibition when it is not in a manner of desire, but only a rabbinic prohibition. This is also proven from the words of the Sidrei Taharah (§195, subsec. 24): “Since we see daily that Jewish physicians feel the pulse and perform other forms of medical examination even on married women, it is evident that ‘it is not prohibited by the Torah.’” End quote. This implies that there is at least a rabbinic prohibition. Similarly, the Kreiti U’Pleiti (Yoreh De’ah §195) wrote that the reason for the customary leniency of physicians is that they are occupied and absorbed in their work. If contact not for affection were completely permitted, why would this reason be necessary? I also saw that the Ezer MiKodesh (Even HaEzer §20, s.v. “Katavti”) wrote that according to the Rambam there is a rabbinic prohibition even when not in a manner of desire, for one must be concerned lest his inclination overcome him and lead to a Torah prohibition. Likewise, Shut Lev Chaim—Palaggi, vol. II (§4), ruled that there is at least a prohibition regarding contact with a married woman even when not for affection. His words are cited in Sdei Chemed (Ma’arechet Chatan VeKallah, letter 12, s.v. “Kerivah”). Rabbi Sdei Chemed was even stricter than he concerning contact not for affection, yet he wrote that it is obvious that a rabbinic prohibition exists. See there. However, in Penei Yehoshua, vol. II (§44), I found that he was uncertain whether there is a rabbinic prohibition concerning an ervah with whom one has no familiarity. Igrot Moshe (Yoreh De’ah, vol. III, §54, letter A) also wrote that there is a rabbinic prohibition regarding contact with an ervah when it is not for the desire of marital relations. (Although these words apparently contradict what he himself wrote in Igrot Moshe, Even HaEzer, vol. II, §14; see there. Nevertheless, his later ruling is primary, as this responsum was written in 1960 and his second responsum in 1969. Still, it is remarkable that he did not mention it at all. See further what he wrote in Igrot Moshe, Even HaEzer, vol. I, end of §57, regarding giving one’s hand to a woman. This requires further examination.)
See also Halichot Olam, vol. VIII (p. 331), where he objected to the ruling of Od Yosef Chai permitting the kissing of a Torah scholar’s hand, and wrote that this improper custom must be prevented. See also Ma’ayan Omer, vol. X, in several responsa where he was very stringent in this matter; it appears that he understood Maran’s view as prohibiting it by the Torah.
Whether This Disqualifies One from Testimony:
D). We now turn to the matter of testimony. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat §34) rules that one is disqualified from testimony, rabbinically, even for rabbinic transgressions. However, Maran the Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat (§34:24), wrote that anyone concerning whom witnesses testified that he committed a particular transgression, even if he was not warned and does not receive lashes, is disqualified from testimony—provided that he transgressed something that is commonly known among the Jewish people to be a transgression. But if they saw him transgressing something in which a person is likely to be acting inadvertently, they must warn him, and only afterward is he disqualified. For example, if they saw him tying or untying on Shabbat, they must inform him that this is Shabbat desecration, because most people do not know this matter. They must likewise tell him that it is Shabbat, perhaps he has forgotten. Similarly, regarding one who gambles with dice or becomes a tax collector, the witnesses must inform him that one who does this is disqualified from testimony, because most people do not know these matters. The same applies in all similar cases. (Its source is the Rambam, Hilchot Edut ch. 12, halachah 1.) See Shut HaGaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger (end of §96), that one who shaves his beard with a razor is not disqualified from testimony; see also Yabia Omer, vol. VIII (Even HaEzer §5).
Therefore, although until now, when you were unaware of the severity of the prohibition, the testimonies you gave were not disqualified, nevertheless, from now on, since you know the severity of the matter and that it is rabbinically forbidden according to most poskim, as well as according to the view of Maran Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, of saintly and blessed memory, you may not serve as a witness for kiddushin from now on.
E). Since you noted in your question that you are a chazzan, it must be considered whether you may serve as a chazzan. See Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim §53). In Yabia Omer, vol. X (addenda, §8), it is written that this is more severe than testimony; therefore, even one who shaves with a razor, whom Rabbi Akiva Eiger permitted as a witness, is nevertheless disqualified from serving as a chazzan, because his record must be exemplary. See also Leket HaKemach (subsec. 37) and Piskei Teshuvot (§53, note 46), where the poskim discuss disqualifying one who shakes hands with a woman from serving as a shaliach tzibbur. This is all the more so for Sephardim, for whom the matter is more stringent.
May the good G-d grant you atonement, and from this point onward, may your accounting be favorable.
With abundant blessings,
Rabbi Meir Pinchasi
This response was translated automatically from Hebrew and has not yet been reviewed by a person. Therefore, it may contain inaccuracies and should not be considered a definitive reference.
